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Identifying firms that win and lose from  
Danish food industry policy 
Derek Baker 
E-mail db@foi.dk 
Abstract 
Policy impacts on Danish food industry firms are investigated.  A methodology is pre-
sented that focuses on classification of firms as winners and losers, and on the expla-
nation of patterns of firms’ variation within that classification.  Survey data from 
2003-2004 are used to define winners and losers from 30 regulatory areas drawn 
from a study of Danish food-related policy.  The regulatory areas extend well beyond 
farm and rural policy to embrace “new food policy”.  Two statistical procedures are 
used to identify association between regulatory areas, types of firms, and patterns of 
winning and losing.  The type of firm, rather than the policy instrument, appears to 
determine patterns of winning and losing.  Firms that own assets upstream and down-
stream from their primary business, and are orientated toward exports and/or im-
ports, are shown to exhibit patterns of winning and losing that conform to the models 
used.  Winning and losing from several policy areas is found not to be associated with 
any specific firm type.  Across all policy areas, firm size was found to be weakly asso-
ciated with patterns of winning and losing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Derek Baker is Senior Research Fellow at the Danish Research Institute of Food Eco-
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Preface 
This report is a part of the 3-year project “Perspectives for Development of the Dan-
ish Food Sector”.  The project targets the policy environment surrounding the Danish 
food marketing chain,1 and has objectives: 
 
1. to measure changes in function, structure and commercial practice in the Da-
nish food industry, and compare and contrast these with developments in 
other countries; 
2. to characterize vertical and horizontal relationships in the Danish food chain, 
and their role in efficiency; 
3. to evaluate the efficiency and competitiveness of the Danish food system at 
each stage of the marketing chain; 
4. to review and evaluate instruments of Danish, EU and foreign public policy 
in the development of the food marketing chain; and 
5. to communicate research results in a number of media. 
 
The research reported here is associated with objectives 2, 3 and 4.   It offers a new 
approach to examining the impacts of food-related policy on the food industry.  It 
presents an explicit definition of, and classification mechanism for, “winners, neu-
trals, and losers” from food industry policies.  From a survey of Danish food industry 
firms, a unique set of firm-level data is generated, entailing firms’ statements about 
policy impacts. 
 
The participation of food industry firms in the survey is gratefully acknowledged.  
Thanks are extended to Jørgen Dejgaard Jensen for substantial commentary on early 
drafts of this report.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The project is partially funded by the Innovations Law of the Danish Ministry of Food and Agri-
culture.  A full description of the project is available at www.dfk.foi.dk.  For further information 
please contact the author. 
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1. Background 
1.1. ”New food policy” 
The policy environment in the food industry has undergone rapid recent change.  A 
“new food policy” has been described, featuring such shifts in emphasis as “from ru-
ral to urban”, “from shop to supermarket” and “from technology to competition” 
(Maxwell and Slater, 2003).  Such changes reflect food industry development toward 
more vertical co-ordination (Boehlje and Sonka, 1998), the accompanying change in 
competitive conditions (Cotterill, 1997) and a range of consumer concerns about the 
environment and food safety (Brouwer and Bijman, 2001), ethics (Blandford and 
Fulpini, 1999) and various demographics (Kinsey and Senauer, 1996).  This paper 
addresses a gap in the available research, resulting from past emphasis on policies re-
lated to farm income maintenance, rural development and protection of consumers’ 
financial interests. 
 
The Danish food industry is consolidating rapidly at processing, distribution and retail 
stages (Baker, 2003), and encounters an increasing number of policy instruments that 
are of the “new food policy” type (Hamann and Baker, 2004).  Danish food industry 
firms list “regulation” amongst the most serious problems they face, both individually 
and as an industry (Baker et al. 2004).  This paper uses a survey of Danish food in-
dustry firms to analyse the impacts of 30 nominated regulatory areas on those firms. 
1.2. “Winners and losers” 
There is an elemental appeal to the identification of winners and losers from policy 
instruments.  It is widely used in political debate, but is not subject to objective meas-
urement nor related to specific policies.  This paper develops an empirical methodol-
ogy for identifying individual firms that win and lose from compliance with specific 
policies. 
 
Food industry firms’ costs of policy compliance have been calculated under a range 
of assumptions for strictures such as elements of food safety at the industry level (e.g. 
Antle, 2000) and more rarely, at the firm level (e.g. Jensen et al., 1998).  Few studies 
have examined both costs and benefits to a sample of different firms to the extent that 
patterns of winning and losing can be identified.  Firms’ attributes have rarely been 
examined in this connection, although one example is the question of whether large 
firms find it cheaper to implement HACCP systems than do small firms (Siebert et al., 
 
6 Danish food industry policy, FØI 
2000).  In this paper, firms’ survey2 responses are processed to identify winners and 
losers, and information on firms’ attributes is used to identify the types of firms that 
win and lose from each policy. 
1.3. Policy areas 
Listing of the elements of specific regulatory areas, and intuitive projections of their 
impacts on food industry firms has targeted, for example, competition policy (Bucci-
rossi et al., 2002) and food safety, research and development, and labelling (Henson 
et al., 1995).  Hamann and Baker (2004) have carried out this exercise for 12 food-
related Acts of the Danish Parliament, which give rise to the 30 legislative areas ex-
amined in this study. 
2. Data and analytical approach 
2.1. Survey 
The survey of Danish food industry firms was conducted between November 2003 
and February 2004.  A sample of 940 food processing and distribution firms was as-
sembled from a variety of sources.  After rejections for duplication, industry exit and 
merger, 700 firms were contacted by telephone and invited to participate in the sur-
vey.  A second telephone call was used to remind participating firms, and eventually 
109 completed questionnaires were received (a 16% response rate).  Of the respon-
dents, 69 were food processors, 29 were food distributors, 9 were input suppliers and 
4 were other actors in the food marketing chain.  The relevant Danish populations are 
believed to be about 350 food processors,3 and about 600 food distributors and input 
suppliers (Baker, 2003).  
 
The survey questionnaire sought basic information on firms’ size, structure and activi-
ties, and firms’ views of the impact of 30 specified regulatory areas.  The list of regu-
latory areas was compiled from a review of the legal basis of Danish food industry 
policy (Hamann and Baker, 2004).  Policies targeted at the farm stage of the food 
chain (e.g. most Common Agricultural Policy instruments) were omitted from the list 
because the survey focuses on food industry firms, and because the 30 regulatory ar-
eas were possibly the practical limit for a questionnaire.  
                                                 
2 For detail of the survey and a complete list of results, see Baker et al. (2004). 
3 Excluding a large number of small bakeries and patisseries. 
 
Danish food industry policy, FØI 7
Firms’ assessments required ticking boxes to indicate whether cost and price catego-
ries would, as consequence of compliance with each policy, “rise”, “fall” or have “no 
impact” (see table 1).  Firms were also permitted to claim “don’t know”, and to not 
respond.  It should be noted that no measures of the extent of changes in prices and 
costs are delivered by the survey, only the directions of those changes.  This approach 
reflects the commercial sensitivity of such information and the need for a standard 
form of firms’ responses. 
2.2. Typing variables 
Descriptive data about the firms (collected in the first part of the questionnaire) were 
used to identify “types” of firms according to their size, commodity sector specialisa-
tion, form of ownership, stage of food chain, degree of vertical integration, branding 
behaviour, trade intensity, etc.  These variables are henceforth referred to as “typing 
variables”, a list of which (with definitions and forms) is presented in table 2. 
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Table 1.  Survey questions on policy impacts 
 
Instructions to firms: 
“Please evaluate each of the following government policies on the price and cost aspects of your firm’s op-
erations” 
 SALES 
PRICES 
PURCHASE 
PRICES 
 
FIXED COSTS
VARIABLE 
COSTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 2002, this 
policy resulted
in  prices to 
customers 
being ... 
In 2002, this 
policy resulted 
in PRICES 
PAD  to  SUP-
PLIERS of ag-
ricultural and 
food products 
being ... 
 
 
In 2002, this 
policy resulted
in this firm’s 
FIXED costs of 
production  
being ...  
 
In 2002, this 
policy resulted 
 in this firms 
VARIABLE 
costs of  
production  
being ...  
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International trade policy for raw agr. products under the 
CAP                  
International trade policy for processed foods & feeds 
under the CAP                 
Legislation related to farmer co-operatives                 
legislation on animal welfare during production                 
Legislation on animal welfare during transport and han-
dling                 
Rules of product nomenclature                 
Rules of prod. quality descrn.  when raw materials are 
purchased.                 
Rules of prod. quality descrn. when products are sold                 
Rules on provision of information about GMO                 
Rules on provision of information about country of origin                 
Rules on provision of information about production 
methods                 
Rules on products’ identify preservation, and traceability                 
Anti-monopoly legislation                 
Anti-trust legislation                 
Copyright and patent law                 
Product liability law                 
Food safety regulation                 
Rules on organic farming and organic food products                 
Legislation on recycling of packaging material                 
Legislation on water use                 
Legislation on waste water discharge                 
Legislation on solid waste disposal                 
Legislation on air quality                 
Legislation on land use and planning                 
Legislation on transport                 
Contract law – regulation of the content of contracts                 
Contract law – regulation of enforcement of contracts                 
Rules of accounting, record keeping and public disclo-
sure                 
Labour law                 
Regulations on business operating hours                  
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Table 2.  Description of typing variables  
Measure Typing variable Units/measure Form taken 
Sales Danish Kroner in 2002 Class Continuous Firm size 
Employment Full-time equivalent in 2002 Class Continuous 
Value-added Sales per em-ployee 
Danish Kroner per employee in 
2002 
Class (high, low) 
Continuous 
Commodity Speciali-
sation Sector 
Meat 
Fish 
Dairy 
Fruits and vegetables 
Alcoholic beverages  
Non-alcoholic beverages 
Other specialised 
Non-specialised 
Class 
Type of agent Stage of chain 
Input supply 
Processing 
Distribution 
Other 
Class 
Brand ownership Number of brands owned in 2002 
Class (high-low in sample) 
Continuous 
Branding behaviour 
Use of retail own-
brands 
% of sales as retailers’ own-
label brands in 2002 
Class (high-low in sample) 
Continuous 
Export intensity % of sales exported in 2002 Class (high-low in sample) Continuous Trade intensity 
Import intensity % of agricultural raw material purchases imported in 2002 
Class (high-low in sample) 
Continuous 
Ownership of 
downstream assets
Number of (specified) assets 
owned downstream from firm’s 
stage of food chain in 2002 
Class (zero and non-zero) 
Continuous 
Ownership of up-
stream assets 
Number of (specified) assets 
owned upstream from firm’s 
stage of food chain in 2002 
Class (zero and non-zero) 
Continuous Vertical integration 
Vertical integration 
by ownership 
% ownership by agents from 
outside the firm’s stage of food 
chain in 2002 
Class (zero and non-zero) 
Continuous 
Ownership Ownership outside food industry 
% ownership by agents from 
outside the food industry in 
2002 
Class (zero and non-zero) 
Continuous 
Diversification outside 
food industry 
% of sales as food 
products 
% ownership by agents from 
outside the firm’s stage of food 
chain in 2002 
Class (zero and non-zero) 
Continuous 
Co-operative owner-
ship Co-operative form 
Ownership by a co-operative in 
2002 Class (Yes and No) 
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2.3. Classification of winners and losers 
Firms’ claims about cost and price movements associated with each legislative area 
are used to generate patterns that allow identification of winners (of two types), los-
ers, and firms described as “neutral”.  The classification is shown in table 3.  Two 
types of winner are identified because of the significance of firms’ ability to pass pol-
icy-related costs onwards in the food marketing chain.  Firms that win by doing this 
are referred to as “pass-through” winners.  Firms that manage to raise prices due to 
this policy while not incurring the costs at all are referred to as winners that “add on”.   
 
Table 3.  Classification of winners and losers 
   
Classification of firm Prices Costs and purchase prices 
   
Loser Fall Rise & no impact 
Neutral 
 
Other combinations  
& “don't know” 
& no response 
Other combinations  
& “don't know” 
& no response 
Winner (with pass-through) Rise Rise 
Winner (by adding on) Rise Fall & no impact 
 
 
 
The distribution of winners and losers, as defined in table 3, is shown in table 4 for all 
firms in the survey.  For all policy areas, the majority of firms are “neutral”.  As many 
as 98% of firms are neutral to contract law (content of contracts) and 97% to contract 
law (enforcement of contracts).  The lowest proportion of neutral firms is found to be 
associated with food safety regulation (55%) and solid waste disposal (56%) and leg-
islation on water use (58%).  The policy areas from which most firms claim to lose 
are labour law (20%), solid waste disposal (18%), and food safety regulations (17%).    
 
Table 4 demonstrates firms’ substantial variation in the pattern of winning and losing 
that is associated with the 30 policy areas.  The analysis in section 3 attempts to iden-
tify patterns in that variation that might identify the characteristics of firms that pre-
dispose to their being winners or loses from each policy area. 
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Table 4.  Distribution of winners and losers in all policy areas (all firms)  
  
 Classification of firm 
 
 
 
 
 
Regulatory area 
Lo
se
r 
N
eu
tra
l 
W
in
ne
r (
w
ith
 
pa
ss
-th
ro
ug
h)
 
W
in
ne
r (
by
  
ad
di
ng
 o
n)
 
 % of all firms in sample 
International trade policy for raw agricultural products under the CAP 11 74 2 13 
International trade policy for processed foods and feeds under the CAP 9 83 3 6 
Legislation related to farmer co-operatives 1 94 1 4 
Legislation on animal welfare during production 7 78 8 7 
Legislation on animal welfare during transport and handling 6 77 7 10 
Rules of product nomenclature 3 90 4 3 
Rules on product quality description when raw materials are purchased 11 72 9 8 
Rules on product quality description when products are sold 12 72 9 7 
Rules on provision of information about Genetically Modified products 9 77 5 9 
Rules on provision of information about products' country of origin 5 84 6 5 
Rules on provision of information about products' production methods 6 82 8 4 
Rules on products' identity preservation, and traceability 16 59 18 7 
Anti-monopoly legislation (regarding pricing and competitive conduct) 3 96 1 0 
Anti-trust legislation (regarding merger and acquisition) 3 92 2 3 
Copyright and patent law 2 95 2 1 
Product liability law 6 79 8 7 
Food safety regulation 17 55 17 11 
Rules on organic farming and organic food products 4 87 3 6 
Legislation on recycling of packaging material 11 72 10 7 
Legislation on water use 13 58 19 10 
Legislation on waste water discharge 14 60 18 8 
Legislation on solid waste disposal 18 56 17 9 
Legislation on air quality 6 78 12 4 
Legislation on land use and planning 2 98 0 0 
Legislation on transport 8 79 5 8 
Contract law - regulation of the content of contracts 1 98 1 0 
Contract law - regulation of enforcement of contracts 0 97 1 2 
Rules of accounting, record keeping and public disclosure 16 74 6 4 
Labour law 20 63 10 7 
Regulations on business operating hours 2 95 1 2 
 
2.4. Relationships between typing variables’ classes, and winners and losers 
The typing variables are used in two ways to subdivide the surveyed firms.  First, 
categorized typing variables are used, as class variables.  Several typing variables 
(e.g. commodity sector and stage of chain) are available only as class variables, while 
others have been classified according to values observed in the survey.  Differential 
policy impacts on large and small firms are of obvious interest, as are those due to 
firms’ export and orientation and degree of value added.  We examine all possible 
classifications of the typing variables, with particular emphasis on firms’ abilities to 
pass on the costs of policy compliance down the marketing chain or to avoid paying 
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costs altogether (possibly by passing costs back up the chain to suppliers).  Examples 
are presented in tables 5 and 6.   
 
In table 5, firms’ distributions of winners and losers are compared across commodity 
sectors for the impact of legislation on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO).  
Some variation is observed: all firms in the survey that operate in the meat sector are 
classified as neutral to GMO legislation; while about 30% of firms in the dairy and 
grains sectors appear to be “winners” from GMO legislation.  It is notable that the 
majority of “winning” dairy firms do so by passing on costs, while the majority of 
grains firms do so by raising prices while avoiding costs.  Winning firms in most sec-
tors appear to do so (by “adding on”) in the same way as firms in the grains sector.  
Although it is intuitively appealing to conclude that GMO has differential impacts on 
commodity sectors, a statistical test is necessary to infer whether this is the case.  
Whether the sectors’ observed distributions are significantly different from each other 
is investigated in section 3. 
 
In table 6, a similar comparison is made for two classes of firms, created by subdivid-
ing the firms’ values for revenue per employee into “low” and “high” categories, with 
reference to legislation concerning traceability of food products.  Both classes of firm 
exhibit similar distributions of losing and neutral firms, the distribution of firms 
amongst the two types of winners is quite different.  Firms with high revenue per em-
ployee appear to be better able to pass on the costs of policy compliance (22% of 
firms with high revenue/employee) than to avoid costs (just 2% of firms with high 
revenue/employee).  This may be explained by value adding activities (branding, 
packaging, quality designation), which would utilise the information derived form 
traceability.  As for table 5’s results, a statistical test is necessary to draw inference 
from the patterns of winning and losing revealed in table 6.  This is presented in sec-
tion 3. 
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Table 5.   Distribution of winners and losers from GMO legislation, by commodity 
sector 
  
 Classification of firm 
 
 
 
 
 
Commodity sector L
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 % of all firms in sample 
Meat 0 100 0 0 
Dairy 14 57 21 7 
Grains 10 60 10 20 
Fruits and vegetables 18 73 0 9 
Fish 11 82 4 4 
Other sectors 4 82 0 14 
Non-specialised firms 17 67 0 16 
     
All firms 9 77 5 9 
 
 
 
Table 6.  Distribution of winners and losers from legislation on traceability, by 
classes of revenue per employee 
  
 Classification of firm 
 
 
 
 
 
Revenue per employee*  L
os
er
 
N
eu
tra
l 
W
in
ne
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 % of all firms in sample 
Low 14 59 14 12 
High 16 60 22 2 
     
All firms 16 59 18 7 
 
* defined as above or below the sample median.  
2.5. Relationships between typing variables’ magnitudes, and winners and 
losers 
The second way that the typing variables are used is as continuous variables.  Win-
ning and losing firms from each policy area are seen to display different means for 
each of the typing variables: tables 7 and 8 provide examples.  In table 7, mean values 
of typing variables are presented for firms classified as winners (of two forms), losers 
and neutral regarding food safety legislation.  Firms that lose from food safety legisla-
tion appear to have, on average, about the same number of employees (first row of 
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table 7) than those that are neutral or win from that policy area, although the firms 
that win by adding on (right hand column), appear to have a smaller average number 
of employees (63) than do the other firms.  
 
With regard to firms’ trade intensity (second and third rows of table 7), average % 
share of exports in sales and % share imports in input purchases show quite different 
patterns.  Firms that win from food safety legislation by passing on costs average just 
18% of sales as exports while those that win by adding on average 44% of sales as 
exports.  Firms that lose from, and are neutral to, food safety legislation have about 
the same export intensity (24% and 26% respectively).  Firms’ import intensity ap-
pears to be approximately constant across losers (47% of inputs are imported), neu-
trals (42%) and winners by passing through (41%), while firms that win by adding on 
import rather less (just 29%) of their inputs.  In the final row of table 7, firms that win 
from food safety legislation by passing on costs feature just 7% of sales as retailers’ 
own-label brands.  This appears to be markedly lower than for losers, neutrals and 
winners that add on.   
 
Table 8 presents a summary for the example of legislation on animal welfare during 
production.  Firms that lose and firms that win by adding on appear to have the small-
est numbers of employees (38 and 50, respectively).  Firms that win from animal wel-
fare legislation by adding on feature just 3% of sales as retailers’ own-label brands 
(final row of table 8).  In section 3, statistical analysis is used to identify relationships 
between the magnitudes of typing variables and firms’ winner/loser classification for 
each of the 30 policy areas in the study. 
 
Table 7.  Mean values of typing variables for firms classified as winners and los-
ers from legislation on food safety 
  
 Classification of firm 
Typing variable 
Lo
se
r 
N
eu
tra
l 
W
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W
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 Mean values for firms in sample 
Number of employees 104 171 159 63 
% of purchases of agricultural raw materials that are imports 24% 26% 18% 44% 
% of sales that are exports 47% 42% 41% 29% 
Number of brands owned 2 8 3 1 
% of sales that are retailers’ own-label brands 21% 22% 7% 22% 
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Table 8.   Mean values of typing variables for firms classified as winners and los-
ers from legislation on animal welfare during production 
  
 Classification of firm 
 
 
 
 
 
Typing variable Lo
se
r 
N
eu
tra
l 
W
in
ne
r (
w
ith
 
pa
ss
-th
ro
ug
h)
 
W
in
ne
r (
by
  
ad
di
ng
 o
n)
 
 Mean values for firms in sample 
Number of employees 38 149 283 50 
% of purchases of agricultural raw materials that are imports 25% 28% 11% 27% 
% of sales that are exports 45% 43% 23% 34% 
Number of brands owned 1 8 3 1 
% of sales that are retailers’ own-label brands 35% 21% 25% 3% 
 
3. Statistical analysis 
3.1. Examination of firms’ win/lose distributions by typing variables  
The first statistical procedure examines the variation apparent in table 4, that policy 
areas are associated with a range of distributions of winning and losing amongst 
firms.  Its aim is to identify typing variables that influence the distribution of winning 
and losing firms for each policy area. 
 
The cross-tabulation procedure in SAS (1998) was used.  This delivers a matrix of 
output similar to tables 5 and 6, with the distribution of firms (in terms of win/lose 
classification) related to the distribution of each typing variable (in terms of the class 
of the typing variable, detailed in table 2).  Pearson’s chi-squared statistic is used to 
test the null hypothesis that firms are distributed identically as winners, losers and 
neutrals, across all classes of each typing variable.   
 
Rejection of the null hypothesis identifies typing variables that influence the likeli-
hood of a firm being a winner or loser from a specific policy.  The inference drawn is 
that firms in two classes of a typing variable (e.g. small and large firms) exhibit dif-
ferent distributions of winning and losing from compliance with an individual policy.  
 
A total of 450 cross-tabulations were constructed: 30 policy areas by 15 typing vari-
ables.  Some 20% of the cross-tabulations featured either an entire row or an entire 
column of zero values, and were eliminated from further analysis.   
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3.2. Examination of differences in typing variables’ means by win/lose classifi-
cation  
The second set of statistical analyses used, where available, the continuous forms of 
typing variables.  It examines the variation apparent in tables 7 and 8, to associate the 
means of each typing variable achieved by firms classified by win/lose for each pol-
icy area.  For each typing variable, the means demonstrated by winners, neutrals and 
losers are compared using a series of paired comparisons, or a “multiple comparison 
procedure” (Hsu, 1996).  Paired means tests used the SAS (1998) embedded Free-
man-Tukey paired t-test procedures.    The Freeman-Tukey procedure adjusts for po-
tentially-spurious type I errors due to the large numbers of tests conducted.  The null 
hypothesis is that for a given policy area, winners, neutrals and losers demonstrate the 
same mean for a given typing variable.   
 
Rejection of the null hypothesis identifies relationships between the magnitude of the 
typing variable and the likelihood that a firm will win from, lose from, or be neutral 
toward, each policy.  Two forms of inference can be drawn.  The first is that the sign 
of relationships between typing variables and win/lose distributions can be identified 
(e.g. are larger firms associated with losing from this policy area, or is it smaller 
firms?).  The second is that relationships amongst win/lose classifications can be de-
rived (e.g. are higher or lower values of a typing variable associated with a firm being 
able to win by pass-through, rather than by adding-on?). 
 
A total of 360 paired means tests were carried out: 12 continuous typing variables by 
30 policy areas.  For each paired means test, 6 comparisons are made, labelled A-F in 
table 9.  
 
Table 9.  Classification of results from paired t-tests  
  
… have a mean of the typing variable significantly different to firms  
classified as … 
 
Firms classified as…  
 
Loser 
 
Neutral 
Winner (with 
pass-through 
Winner (by  
adding on) 
Loser  D E F 
Neutral   B C 
Winner (with pass-through)    A 
Winner (by adding on)     
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3.3. Relationship between the two statistical analyses 
The tests of equivalence of distributions provide inference about whether the numbers 
of winners and losers is affected by the typing variable for each policy area.  The 
paired tests of winners, losers and neutrals’ means for each typing variable identifies 
specific relationships between typing variables and the distribution of winners and 
losers. 
 
The strength of the test of equivalence of distributions is that it signals the presence of 
any significant relationship.  This is important where multi-modal outcomes are pos-
sible: for example where a policy affects very large and very small firms but not mid-
dle size firms.  The procedure has two weaknesses.  The first is that it does not iden-
tify the “direction” of the relationship, in that significantly-different distributions are 
not necessarily associated with the magnitudes or class of typing variables.  Its second 
weakness in the current context is that it tends to be dominated by neutral firms, as for 
each policy area this is where the bulk of the distribution lies.  More subtle relation-
ships, such as between the two forms of winner identified in this study, may be over-
looked. 
 
The strength of the paired means tests is that every possible relationship in table 9 is 
assigned appropriate degrees of freedom, so that there is no dominance by neutral 
firms.  The weakness of the paired means tests is that only “linear” relationships are 
identified by rejection of the null hypothesis.  The multi-modal outcome as described 
above would not be detected. 
4. Results 
4.1. Tests of distributions of winners, losers and neutrals 
The results of the tests of distribution are shown in table 10.  Each column of table 10 
represents a typing variable, and each row a regulatory area.  Each cell represents a 
statistical test for the significance of the typing variable in determining the distribu-
tion of firms as winners and losers due to a given policy. 
 
Note that in this test, the typing variables have been broken into classes (“high”, 
“low”, etc).  Where firms in the different classes of the typing variables display statis-
tically significant (at 10% level of the test) distributions amongst winners, losers and 
neutrals, an asterisk (*) appears in table 10.  The right hand column in table 10 re-
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cords the total number of typing variables that are significant for each regulatory area.  
The bottom row records the total number of regulatory areas for which each typing 
variable demonstrates different distributions of winners and losers. 
 
For two legislative areas (recycling, and on solid waste disposal) no typing variables 
yield classes that have significantly different distributions of winners and losers.  The 
inference drawn is that we cannot identify, from this analysis, any particular type of 
firm that wins or loses from these two policy areas.   
 
The regulatory areas associated with the largest number of significant typing variables 
are animal welfare during transport and handling (5 typing variables), copyright and 
patent law, and regulations on business operating hours (both with 4 significant typ-
ing variables).  The inference drawn is that regulation of animal welfare during trans-
port and handling (for example) affects different types of firms in different ways.  In 
particular, different distributions of winners, losers and neutrals have been identified 
for firms: at different stages of the food marketing chain; with different usage of re-
tailers’ own brands; with different export intensities; with different levels of owner-
ship of upstream assets; and with different levels of specialisation in the food industry 
(sales of food products as a % of all sales). 
 
Amongst typing variables, just one exhibits no statistically significant association: 
number of employees.  The other measure of firm size (annual sales) shows signifi-
cantly different patterns of distribution of winning and losing in 3 policy areas: prod-
uct liability, food safety, and accounting rules.   
 
The typing variable that appears to influence firms’ winning and losing from the larg-
est number of policy areas is export intensity (10 policy areas), followed by two dif-
ferent measures of firms’ vertical integration (8 policy areas each).  Firms’ export in-
tensity (the % of all sales that are exported) influences the distribution of winners, 
losers and neutrals that results from: animal welfare regulations (both at production 
and processing stages); required provision of information (2 forms of quality descrip-
tion, GMO-content, trace-ability, country of origin, organic status); antimonopoly 
regulation and accounting rules.  
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The significance of firms’ export intensity is to be expected.  Animal welfare regula-
tion concerns may affect exporters less than those serving the Danish market, and ex-
porting firms may be able to choose markets in which they can be sure to pass on 
compliance costs to their customers (e.g. Danish pork products in the British market).  
Similarly, information-related policies (including rules on organics) are likely to af-
fect firms differently, depending on the location of the final consumers.  Import inten-
sity as a typing variable is far less influential, but intuitively sound: Danish rules on 
organics and food safety are likely to raise costs for importing firms, as demonstrated 
in the results. 
 
A notable result is that firms’ sector orientation (see fourth column of table 10) is less 
important in determining policies’ impacts on a firm than is the stage at which it op-
erates in the marketing chain (fifth column of table 10).  Firms’ stage of the food 
chain is significant in determining patterns of winning and losing from policy related 
to animal welfare, trade barriers, legal aspects of co-operatives’ operation, and ac-
counting rules.  Firms’ sector of operation is influential in firms’ winning and losing 
from policies on information provision about production methods, waste water dis-
charge and business operating hours: all three of which are policy areas that intuition 
would suggest are sector-specific.    
 
Two of the three typing variables associated with vertical integration show strong sig-
nificance.  Firms show significantly different distributions of winners and losers due 
to variation in their ownership of upstream assets (column 11 of table 10) and the ex-
tent of ownership by firms from other stages in the food chain (column 13 of table 
10).  However, distributions of winners and losers for these two typing variables are 
affected by different sets of policies.  Ownership of upstream assets affects the distri-
bution of winners and losers from trade policy, animal welfare and food safety regula-
tion, as well as land use planning rules and rules on business operating hours.  Varia-
tion in vertical integration by ownership, on the other hand, is associated with con-
tract law (most relevant to non-integrated firms) and with traceability and quality de-
scription (often subject to contracts).  These results all conform to expectations. 
 
Ownership from outside the food industry is the only typing variable in table 10 found 
to be related to anti-trust policy.   It is not clear whether firms from outside the food 
industry actually face different procedures for acquisition than do food industry firms, 
but the perception has appeared in this survey.  
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Firms’ branding behaviour is significant in determining patterns of winners and los-
ers.  Variation in numbers of brands owned is associated with differential impacts of 
copyright law, as might be expected.  Use of retailers’ own-label brands is, also as 
expected, associated with regulations on product nomenclature and quality descrip-
tions. 
 
Several cases of unexpected associations arise.  These include the association between 
use of retailers’ own-label brands and animal welfare legislation, and the result that 
co-operative ownership is a factor in determining winners and losers from labour law. 
4.2. Tests of nature of relationship between typing variables and winners and 
losers 
Table 11 summarises the relationships between firms’ values for continuous typing 
variables and firms’ status as a winner (of two possible types), loser or neutral.  Non-
empty cells in table 11 indicate a statistically-significant difference between the mean 
of the typing variable for each of winners by pass-through, winners by adding on, 
neutrals and losers.  Non-empty cells contain a letter (A-E) and a sign (+ or -).  The 
letter corresponds to the result classification in table 9.  The sign indicates the nature 
of the relationship between value of the typing variable and the firms’ classification 
as a winner or loser: a positive sign denotes that means of the typing variables for 
winners are significantly higher than means for neutrals, etc. 
 
The most striking aspect of table 11 is its difference in configuration from table 10.  
This is due to the nature of the typing variables in each case.  Taking values of export 
intensity (column 6 of table 11) as an example, only 1 policy area (information provi-
sion about GMO) yields a significant result.  In table 10 (column 8) differences in dis-
tribution of winners and losers from 10 policy areas were identified.  For this exam-
ple, the “F-“ result in table 11 indicates that high levels of export intensity are associ-
ated with firms being losers, rather than winners by adding-on, from regulations on 
GMO-related information provision.  For GMO, we identified no other pairs of means 
for typing variables that were significantly different. 
 
By way of contrast, the “ABCDEF-” results for both animal welfare policies (rows 4 
and 5, column 9 of table 11) indicates that a firm’s high levels of ownership of up-
stream assets is associated with losing from animal welfare regulations rather than be-
ing neutral or winning, being neutral rather than winning, and winning by pass-
through rather than by adding-on.  In this case, the tables 10 and 11 conform: owner-
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ship of upstream assets is shown to significantly influence the distribution of winners 
and losers from both forms of animal welfare regulation. 
 
The second striking feature of table 11 is the repeated appearance of the designation 
“A” for tests involving four of the typing variables (sales per employee, use of retail 
brands, and ownership of upstream and downstream assets), but not other typing vari-
ables.  This indicates that those typing variables are significant in determining 
whether firms win by passing on cost increases or by avoiding cost increases but tak-
ing advantage of policy-induced price increases.  Notably, the incidence of “A” is ob-
served across a range of regulatory areas (rows of table 11), while being confined to a 
narrow range of typing variables (columns of table 11).  This indicates that the type of 
firm is the decisive factor in the form of winning they display, and not the regulatory 
area that they win from.  
 
In table 11, firms’ size (measured either in sales or in number of employees) is shown 
to be unrelated to firms’ winning and losing from the regulatory areas studied here.  
High levels of import intensity are shown to be associated with firms that lose, rather 
than be neutral or win, from CAP-related trade barriers and rules on organic foods.  
These more subtle relationships are not detected by comparison of distributions in ta-
ble 10. 
 
Positive signs in the bottom row of table 11 indicate that regulations on shop opening 
hours favour firms with high levels of import intensity and firms for which food 
products are a high share of all sales.  Table 10’s tests of distributions confirm those 
results, as well as showing that sector (a class variable) is significant in determining 
the impact of legislation on shop opening hours.  These results are intuitively sound: 
Danish law on shop opening hours discriminates between retail enterprises according 
to size.  Although no retailers participated in the survey, the impacts are clear: small 
retail shops (permitted to be open longer hours) tend to sell fresh vegetables and dairy 
products, but not meat and fish, so the significance of “sector” is indirect, but entirely 
logical. 
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In both tables 10 and 11, ownership of upstream assets generates very different con-
figurations of winners and losers from each policy.  Also in both tables, its influence 
is much different from that of ownership of downstream assets.  In table 11, firms 
with high levels of downstream asset ownership gain from animal welfare legislation, 
policies involving information provision, food safety and product liability law, and 
environmental legislation (a + sign in table 11).  Conversely, firms with high levels of 
upstream asset ownership tend to lose from the same policies (a – sign).  The explana-
tion may be that firms that integrate downstream already have experience with com-
pliance with legislation on animal welfare, information provision and food safety in 
implementation and management, so that they have learned to pass on costs on or 
avoid them altogether.  Conversely, firms that integrate upstream may lack that ex-
perience, and confront new sets of costs as a consequence of vertical integration. 
    
In table 11, relationships between continuous measures of branding behaviour and 
winner/loser classifications are weak (columns 4 and 5).  The number of brands 
owned is not associated with winning and losing from any policy area.  Firms with a 
high share of sales of retailers’ own-label brands tend to be losers from product no-
menclature law, rather than being neutral to it.  Similarly, they lose from antimonop-
oly regulation.  No strong arguments can be made, from the available information, to 
comment further on those results. 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
5.1. Overview 
This paper offers a new approach to examining the impacts of food-related policy on 
the food industry.  It presents an explicit definition of, and classification mechanism 
for, “winners, neutrals, and losers” from food industry policies.  A unique set of firm-
level data is used, and firms’ statements about policy impacts are utilised.  The analy-
sis involves Danish firms and the impact of policies as implemented in Denmark.   
 
The classification of winners and losers recognises that firms in the food marketing 
chain have the potential to pass on costs to their customers.  This is an element of the 
modern food marketing that is frequently referred to in policy analysis, but is rarely 
quantified by firm-level data or in statements by firms.  Similarly, firms that avoid 
compliance costs altogether but benefit from consumers’ willingness to pay for com-
pliance-related attributes (e.g. food safety or animal welfare) are not usually ac-
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counted for in policy analysis.  For this purpose, this paper differentiates between 
these two forms of “winning” by firms.  
 
The survey used provides supporting data about firms, referred to here as “typing 
variables”.  The method of sub-dividing firms by typing variable uses two ap-
proaches: discrete classes and the means of the typing variable.  These two ap-
proaches are complementary in their contributions to the analysis. 
5.2. Main conclusions 
The impact of “new food policy” instruments on Danish food industry firms appears 
to depend more on the attributes of the firms (as represented by the typing variables) 
than on the policies.  None of the 30 regulatory areas examined here were shown con-
sistently to affect the distribution of winners and losers, nor to be associated with the 
mean values of the typing variables.  However, several typing variables are shown to 
consistently determine patterns of winning and losing from policy instruments.  These 
include trade intensity, vertical integration, and the share of sales that are food indus-
try products.   
 
Firms’ size and branding behaviour are shown to be of little significance, as is owner-
ship from outside the food industry.  This result partially contradicts the view that 
“new food policies” favour large firms and reinforce industrial concentration: 
HACCP and other food safety-related compliance being the often-cited example.   
 
In this paper, firm size is shown to affect the distribution of winners and losers from 
food safety regulations, but the analysis does not confirm that large firms are winners 
nor that small firms are losers.  In general, winners and losers from food safety regu-
lations are not identifiable from the typing variables employed in this study.  This 
may be interpreted as evidence that their impact is somewhat consistent amongst 
firms.  Other policy areas that display little or no association with the typing variables 
used are recycling of packaging materials and solid waste disposal.   
 
Co-operative legislation, product nomenclature, water use and air quality, and labour 
law are similarly not associated with many of the typing variables used.  These results 
may be explained either by Denmark’s long history with these policy instruments (so 
that firms have all adjusted accordingly) or an exceptionally good policy design that 
provides neutrality across typing variables.   
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Vertical integration was found to be a strong influence on firms’ winning and losing 
from policies.  Both the “direction” of vertical integration (upstream or downstream) 
and its form (by ownership of assets or ownership of firms) appear to be critical de-
terminants of firms’ patterns of winning and losing across a range of policy areas.  In 
several policy areas (animal welfare, policy toward co-operatives), firms with high 
levels of downstream assets win, while those with high levels of upstream assets lose.    
For many of the policy areas examined here (e.g. environmental policies and those 
involving information provision), these results are to be expected in a sample domi-
nated by food processors: they are experienced in dealing with those regulatory areas 
while downstream firms buying upstream assets are not.    
 
Vertical integration by ownership of the firm (rather than by investment in assets) is 
not a significant typing variable.  Many Danish food processing firms are vertically-
integrated by ownership (in particular, they are owned by large farmer co-operatives) 
and the fact that this typing variable is insignificant is of considerable interest for fu-
ture research. 
5.3. Limitations of the research 
The research suffers from two weaknesses related to its reliance on survey data.  The 
first is that samples are necessarily small and any classification system reduces the 
degrees of freedom available to statistical tests.  The second is that firms’ responses, 
however categorical, are subject to the respondent’s understanding of the question and 
motivation towards it. 
 
The classification of winners and losers is necessarily arbitrary, and may be criticised 
for its equivalent treatment of “don’t know” and “no response”.  This partly accounts 
for the preponderance of “neutral” firms for all policy areas.  It is proposed that the 
application of consistent procedures across all policy areas and typing variables off-
sets any bias introduced.   
 
A consequence of not asking firms to supply financial data is that classification of 
winners and losers does not involve measurement of the extent of price and cost in-
creases due to each policy area.  The result is that firms that, for example, “lose a lit-
tle” are classified the same way as firms that “lose a lot”.  More seriously, different 
extents of price and cost increases may even alter a firm’s classification from winner 
to loser and vice-versa.  However, it is unlikely that sufficient numbers of firms 
would have responded to questions that required the degree of financial detail to 
overcome this problem. 
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The typing variables used are imperfect measures of the concepts under study.  Verti-
cal integration, trade intensity, branding behaviour, and several other variables are all 
measured using survey questions that were, by design, simple and unobtrusive.  The 
simplicity may have resulted in firms’ misunderstanding the question, while unobtru-
siveness prevents access to financial data.  
 
Overall, the statistical procedures produced consistent and/or complimentary results 
that were logical and intuitively explicable.  However, a small number of anomalies 
arose in the form of inexplicable significance and insignificance of some tests.  It is 
proposed that these are relatively small effects and do not detract from the results ac-
hieved. 
5.4. Extensions of the research 
The research is suitable for duplication in countries other than Denmark, although ad-
justments would need to be made to names given to regulatory areas to reflect the dif-
ferent policy environments.  Both within and beyond the European Union, much 
could be gained from an understanding of differential impacts of policies either ac-
cording to policy area or to firms’ characteristics. 
 
A necessary extension of this research is the quantification of net benefits, to allow a 
more sophisticated classification of winners, neutrals and losers.  This would not be 
feasible in a mail survey, but would be attempted by some high-cost survey method 
(possibly interviews).  More discriminating measures of the typing variables would 
also sharpen the analysis: candidates include measurement of skill levels in firms’ 
workforce, value added, product ranges and debt loadings.  The significance of brand 
management in the modern food system also justifies an alternative approach to typ-
ing variables associated with brands.  Beyond the typing variables used here, firms’ 
behaviour is also of interest.  The incidence and type of contracting, approach to pur-
chases and sales, use of advertising, debt levels and a range of other variables may 
further explain firms’ capacities to win and lose from policies. 
 
More detailed specification of policies and policy areas would be of benefit in any ex-
tension of the research.  The current study used laws and regulations drawn from 12 
Acts of the Danish parliament.  However, the survey questionnaire gave no guidance 
to firms as to which regulation might generate specific compliance costs and benefits.  
This could also be addressed in an interview-based procedure. 
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